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IN THE S.UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD W·HIPPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs.-
HAROLD FULLER, 
Defendant and Appellant 
- vs.-
DON C. CHRISTENSEN, 




Plaintiff and Respondent's Brief 
The defendant Harold Fuller entered into a contract with 
the third party defendant Don C. Christensen, a licensed con-
tractor, for the remodeling of the former's residence at 105 
"B'' Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, for $5,770.00. The defendant 
did not require t~ contractor to furnish a bond pursuant to .t 
}! "''f4tff .tJ,t_l!"~~ 9il(t.f:..~eil:,.... c.pnt-Yc.c: the mandate of ection 4-~-1, -u. C. P/..., 1950. 1\. On JUlle 3, 
1951, the said Don C. Christensen entered into a contract with -J ~~ fu .II) 1,s.l. .P 1 A t ~' T./' s d 'I c:f ~q T_(f', let I.J. tJs7ur 
the plaintiff, a licensed plunfber,l\to do certain plumbing work 
for the sum of $1,513.00. The contract provided that any ad-
ditional materials or labor furnished upon request would be 
paid for at a price mutually agreed upon by the parties. The 
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Plaintiff fully performed said contract and furnished additional 
material at the agreed price of $133.50. The defendant paid 
the. third party defendant in full but the latter went bankrupt 
and did not pay the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded 
judgment for $1,303.00, the amount of the wholesale price of 
the materials and extras furnished by the plaintiff. The de-
fendant appeals and the plaintiff cross-appeals for judgment 
for the full amount. 
STATEME,NT OF POINTS 
I 
THE PLAlNTfFF IS NOT SUIN1G ON HIS C~ONTRACT 
O~F JUNE 3, 1951, BUT ON H'I1S CAU~SE O~F ACTI,ON UN-
DE:R SE~CTI,O·N:S 14- 2 -1 AN:D 14- 2- 2, U. C. A., 1953. 
H1E IS EiN·~ITLE~D TO· R:E:C,O·VER B·Y VIRTUE OF SAID 
STAT~UTE EVEN THO:U,G·H HE MI,OHT BE B·A·RRED FR01M 
ENFOR·CI,.N,G H~IS ~CONTRACT B·E,CAUSE 01F NOT HEI~NG 
A LI'C'E,N,SED C:ONTRA·CTOR UNDER SE1CTI~0'N 58-6-10, 
U. ~C. A., 1953, ALTH'0'U'GH HE WAS L'IC,ENSE'D A:S A 
PUUMB·ER UN'.DER SE1C.~IO·N 58-18-2, u. ·C. A., 1953. 
II 
THE C~OINTR·ACT PR,ICE O·F T~H~E M·EHOHANiD,JSV A~N·D 
M:ATERIA,LS FURNirS~H'ED AND SERV:I'CE'S REN'DERE·D 
WAS T1HE REASO~NAB,LE VAL'UE OF T:HE SArME. 
ARGU~MENT 
I 
'frHE. P.LAINTriFF IS NOT SUING ON HIS CONTRACT 
()F JUN~E· 3, 1951, B1UT ON-HilS CAUSE OF ACTION U·N:DER 
SECTI·O:NS 14-2--1 AN1D 14-2-·2, u. c. A., 1953. HE' IS EN-
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3 
TIT~LED TO RECOVER BY VIRT'U'E O·F SAID STATUTE 
EVEN THOIU·GH HE MIIGHT BE BARREID FRO!M EN-
FORCIN~G HJIS CO·NT·RA~CT BEICAIUSE O~F N:OT B'EING 
A LI1CENSED C01NTRA~CTOR UNDER SECTION 58-6-10, 
U. C. A., 1953, AL TH·OIU·GH HE WAS LI1CENSEiD AS A 
PLUM!BER U·ND~ER SECTION 58-18-2, U. C. A., 1953. 
14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, states: 
''The owner of any interest in land entering a con-
tract . . . for the construction, addition to, or alteration 
or repair of, any building . . . shall, before any such 
work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond 
. . . conditioned for the faithful performance of the 
contract and prompt payment for material furnished 
and lahar perform.ed under the contract ... ; and any 
person who has furnished materials or performed labor 
for or upon any such building . . . payment for which 
has not been made, shall have a direct right of action 
against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable 
value of the materials furnished or labor performed, 
not exceeding . . . the price agreed upon ... " (Italics 
supplied by the respondent). 
It will be noted from the wording of the statute that the 
clear intent is to assure payment to any person who furnishes 
materials and labor. No distinction is made as to whether that 
person is to be a sub-contractor, mechanic or materialman, li-
censed or unlicensed. 
Liberty Coal and Lumber Co. vs. Snow, 53 U. 298. 178 Pac. 
341, said that the purpose of this particular statute was to pre-
vent owners of land from having their lands improved with 
materials and labor furnished and performed by third persons, 
and thus enhance the value of such lands, without becoming 
personally responsible for the reasonable value of materials 
and. labor. 
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14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953, says: 
"Any person subject to the provisions of this chap-
ter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient 
bond ... shall be personally liable to all persons who 
have furnished materials or performed labor under 
the contract for the reasonable value . . . " (Italics sup-
plied by respondent). 
In this case, it is true that the defendant paid the prime 
contractor in full, but he failed to protect third parties as re-
quired by law and for his neglect or failure the law requires 
that he pay twice, if need be, to assure the third party of his 
just due and to compensate for failure to furnish adequate 
protection for interested persons. The law places this respon-
sibility upon the owner as the one who gains the most by the 
improvements and the one who is in the best position to re-
quire security to protect third parties. Instead of penalizing 
the offender by fine as is the case in the statutes regulating 
plumbers and contractors, the state subjects the offender to 
double payment, a greater penalty ordinarily than the fines for 
failure to procure either a contractor's license or a plumber"s 
license, clearly evidencing the legislature's concern that all 
,who provide improvements be paid for the same. 
The issue in this case, so far as the defendant's appeal 
is concerned, is whether the "any person" and "all persons" 
respectively of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-·2-2, U. C. A., 1953, are 
to be construed as restricted to a special group as contended 
for the defendant (see Page 11 of defendant's Brief) or con-
strued to mean as they say "any person" and all persons" re-
spectively "who furnish materials or labor." 
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The defendant cites no cases which create such judicial 
exceptions as he urges and in their absence the plaintiff urges 
this court to construe the language in the light of its plain 
meaning. 
Even if Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, are to be construed 
as benefiting only those who hold the requisite licenses 
for furnishing the materials and doing the work for which they 
sue under that statute, the plaintiff respectfully submits that he 
was licensed to do all that he did and for which he herein sues. 
The evidence is uncontradicted and the defendant has 
stipulated to the fact that the plaintiff was, at all times in ques-
tion, a licensed plumber and had complied with the require-
ments set forth in 58-18-2 (a) of U. C. A., 1953, which provides: 
"Each applicant for a certificate to engage in the 
trade of plumbing as a journeyman plumber, must pro-
duce satisfactory evidence of good moral character and 
pass a satisfactory examination under the rules and reg-
ulations of the department of registration.'' 
A "journeyman plumber" is defined in 58-18-5 (a) as follows: 
"A person who has passed the examination herein provided 
and whose name is duly registered with the department of reg-
istration as a journeyman plumber." 
The "trade of plumbing" is defined in 58-18-5 (c), U. C. A., 
1953, as follows: c:c:The performing of any mechanical work per-
taining to the installation, alteration, change, repair, removal, 
maintenance and use in buildings . . . of pipes, fixtures and 
fittings for bringing in the water supply and removing . . . 
water carried wastees ... " 
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These statutes constitute a police regulation enacted to pro-
tect public interests as much or more than the "contracting" 
statutes relied on by the defendant. 
In this instance the plaintiff installed two bathtubs, two 
toilets, two wash basins, four kitchen sinks and water and drain 
pipes necessary for installation of the mentioned items, all 
of which was work clearly within the purview of the statute 
regulating the "trade of plumbing" as herein set forth. 
The legislature did not say or intend to say, as the de-
fendant would have us believe, that before a license! plumber 
can contract to do plum bing he has to be licensed also as a 
contractor. If that were so, then all plumbers working for 
themselves must also be licensed ·contractors, for then all work 
done by them would come within the classification of con-
tractor or sub-contractor. 
The defendant argues that the legislature intended the 
construction he is advancing by citing 58-18-14, ·u. C. A., 1953, 
(regulating plumbers) as follows: "The general provisions of 
Title 58 ... including the prohibitions and penalties thereof, 
shall be applicable to the administration and enforcement of 
this aot, in so far as they are not in conflict herewith." There is 
no ambiguity here in what was intended. Tttle 58 regulates 
both contractors and plumbers. 58-1-1 to and including 39 
is entitled "General PrQvisions." These provisions apply to 
plumbers, but only if they are not in conflict with the chapter 
regulating plumbers. There is no indication that the legisla-
ture intended by any of said general provisions that licensed 
plumbers are also to be licensed as contractors, as the defendant 
contends. Had such been the legislative intent, it is difficult 
to understand why such requirement was not expressly stated. 
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The defendant places great stress on the following sec-
tions within the contractors statute, U. 'C. A. 1953: 58-6-1 Li-
' ' 
cense to Do Business; 58-6-3, '~Contractor" Defined; and 58-6-10, 
Violation of Act- Penalty. 
Dow vs. United States, a 1946 case originating in Utah, 
involved an unlicensed sub-contractor who had fully performed 
his sub-contract, which was the excavation of footings for certain 
buildings. The prime contractor had been paid for the work 
completed, including the work of said sub-contractor but sought 
to avoid payment to the sub-contractor on the ground that the 
latter was unlicensed. After citing the statutory provisions 
relied upo/:the defendant herein the court held: "Neither 
these statutory provisions nor any others called to our attention 
provide in express language that a contract employing an un-
licensed contractor to perform services falling within the field 
of his trade shall be unenforceable.n Dow vs. United States, 
154 F. 2nd 707, 710. 
In short, this case holds that on unlicensed sub-contractor 
acting within his field or profession can recover from the prime 
conuactor when the work has been fully performed and the 
prime contractor has been paid for the complete job, including 
the work performed by the sub-contractor. 
What appears, from defendant's Brief, Page 5, to be de-
fendant's best case in support of his contention, is Kirman vs. 
Borzage, 65 C. A. 2nd 165, 150 Pac. 2nd 3. Quoting defendant, 
"The Second District Court of Appeals in applying similar 
licensing statutes ruled that a licensed plumber could not main-
tain any action in the courts resulting from undertaking to 
do plumbing work on a contract basis without showing that 
the plumber had a contractor's license.'' 
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In that case, the following fact situation is involved. A 
partnership performed extensive plumbing work for the owner 
of property. No intermediate party was involved. ·One of 
the partners was a licensed master plumber but the partnership· 
itself was not licensed either as a plumber or as a contractor. 
The California statute provides that it was unlawful for a 
partnership or joint venture to contract without first being 
separately licensed even if all partners were licensed to operate 
individually. Here, then, the partnership is treated as a sep-
arate entity, and it was held that the master plumber's license 
was not sufficient to remove the case from the operation of 
the statute. The court said in effect that a licensed plumber is 
licensed to contract individually but not as a partnership unless 
the partnership is also licensed. 
The general rule that a sub-contractor is within covef>age 
of the contractor's bond for not only labor and materials, but 
also profit when the contract has been performed is stated in 
119 A. L. R. 1282, as follows: 
" ... where the sub-contractor has fully performed 
his conmact, so that nothing remains but to pay the 
contract price, or balance due thereon, the recovery of 
profit is not to be denied merely because it is profit 
rather than the value of labor and materials furnished; 
and the amount of recovery being liquidated under 
the contract, the recovery of profit is not to be denied 
on the ground that the damages are not ascertained, 
as would be the case where the contract is only partly 
performed." 
II 
~HE CONTRACT PRICE OF ~HE MATERIALS FUR-
NISHED AN~D SERVI'C,ES REN:DE·RED WAS THE REA-
SONA·BLE VA'L'U:E O'F TH·E SAME. 
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In lower court, the plaintiff testified that he was able to 
get the fixtures and materials, which were used on the job, at 
wholesale, and that the wholesale price came to approximately 
$1,150.00. When asked how he arrived at the contract price 
as a basis for his charge, he replied that he had figured a one-
third mark-up on the wholesale price which was the custom 
of the trade when furnishing materials and fixtures for a job, 
and that such mark-up was fair and reasonable. When the sum 
of the $383.00 markup and the wholesale price were subtracted 
from the total claim leaving a balance of $113.50, the plaintiff 
was asked if this latter figure was the amount to be attributed 
to the labor for the job. The plaintiff said that it was. The 
plaintiff further testified that such a figure would not ade-
quately compensate for the amount of labor performed but in 
order to submit as low a bid as possible he had to cut the 
price somewhere. The price was fixed by bid and the plaintiff 
was the lowest bidder in competitive bidding. Defendant of-
fered no testimony which would justify a conclusion that the 
contract price was greater than a fair and reasonable value of 
materials furnished and labor performed, and no question was 
raised as to the quality of plaintiff's performance. 
Even assuming the defendant's contentions are correct and 
the plaintiff should be required to take out a contractor's li-
cense as well as a plumber's license in order to recover for 
his services, that would not prevent the plaintiff from recov-
ering for the materials he furnished. As a materialman he is 
not required to furnish a contractor's license because he does 
not come wi·thin the purview of the contractors' statute 58-6-3 
( 1Contractor Defined) U. c .. A., 1953. 
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CONCLUSION 
By virtue of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953, the plaintiff 
is entitled to recover from the defendant for the reasonable 
value of the fixtures and materials furnished and the labor 
performed. The Plaintiff's claim is the reasonaole value and 
the lower court erred in granting judgment for a lesser amount. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORRIS D. Y~O~U.NG and 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
65 East Fourth South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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